In the Nyāyasūtras (NS), the fundamental text of the Nyāya tradition, testimony is defined as a statement of a reliable speaker (āpta). According to the NS, such a speaker should possess three qualities: competence, honesty and desire to speak. The content of a discourse, including the prescriptions, is also considered reliable due to the status of a given author and the person that communicated it. -/- The Polish philosopher J.M. Bocheński similarly stresses the role of a speaker; he holds that (...) an authoritative source (whose discourse is called testimony) should be competent and truthful. The conditions of trust and superiority also apply. According to Bocheński, being an authority entails a special relation—it has a subject, object and field. Notably, Bocheński develops his own typology of testimony by distinguishing between what he calls epistemic and deontic authority. He asks questions such as: Who can be the subject of an authoritative statement? Which features should the speaker possess? How is authority recognised? Is there a universal or an absolute authority? What is the field of authority? Moreover, which qualities should the listener possess? -/- The Nyāya philosophers, both the ancient ones, like Akṣapāda Gautama, Vātsyāyana, Vācaspati Miśra, and the contemporary scholars of Nyāya, such as B. K. Matilal and J. Ganeri, were also concerned with these issues. -/- The aim of this paper is to discuss the above points in a comparative manner. I will argue that both Bocheński’s and the Nyāya accounts share very similar perspectives and encounter analogous problems. (shrink)

In our article (Zawadzki and Adamczyk 2021), we analyzed threats that novel memory modifying interventions may pose in the future. More specifically, we discussed how optogenetics’ potential for reversible erasure/deactivation of memory “may impact authenticity by producing changes at different levels of personality.” Our article has received many thoughtful open peer commentaries for which we would like to express our great appreciation. We have identified two main threads of objections. They are related to the potential applicability of optogenetics as a (...) therapeutic memory modification technology (MMT) in humans—applicability thread, and the normative value of authenticity, that is, the assumption that preserving authenticity is valuable (either in general or in the particular approach we adopted)—normative thread. Both of these threads concern fundamental issues: The former deals with the scientific credibility of the case vignette on which our discussion is based, and the latter deals with the normative weight of our considerations. We think that addressing both of them can be instructive in a broader context as they reflect a more general disagreement among neuroethicists about the very purpose and method of our discipline. (shrink)

Optogenetics is an invasive neuromodulation technology involving the use of light to control the activity of individual neurons. Even though optogenetics is a relatively new neuromodulation tool whose various implications have not yet been scrutinized, it has already been approved for its first clinical trials in humans. As optogenetics is being intensively investigated in animal models with the aim of developing novel brain stimulation treatments for various neurological and psychiatric disorders, it appears crucial to consider both the opportunities and dangers (...) such therapies may offer. In this review, we focus on the memory-modifying potential of optogenetics, investigating what it is capable of and how it differs from other memory modification technologies. We then outline the safety challenges that need to be addressed before optogenetics can be used in humans. Finally, we re-examine crucial neuroethical concerns expressed in regard to other MMTs in the light of optogenetics and address those that appear to be unique to the memory-modifying potential of optogenetic technology. (shrink)

In this brief piece, Jennifer McErlean comments on Kevin Elliott’s thesis that we should decrease or even cease philosophical efforts to build more inclusive biocentric ethical accounts and instead increase efforts to build indirect anthropocentric arguments. While McErlean agrees that it is sensible to marshal a multiplicity of standpoints to strengthen policies that protect the natural world, she disagrees that philosophers no longer need to consider whether nature has intrinsic value. Two specific criticisms are offered. One is that (...) indirect arguments are utilitarian and ethicists ought not to limit themselves a morality of consequences. The second is that underlying principles will make a difference, so that even if anthropocentric arguments currently converge with biocentric ones, we should not anticipate this will continue in future instances. (shrink)

In the chapter, there is an analysis of sharing economy development in Poland. It concerns both the big players on the market like the most known Airbnb and Uber, as well as smaller, local initiatives, flourishing especially in the food sector. Sharing economy is not a normative concept and is defined differently depending on the subject to which it refers. However, the significance of the phenomenon is rising rapidly from year to year. Moreover, sharing economy brings many opportunities but also (...) creates a lot of unsolved issues, such as regulations, tax regulations, labour law, competition, which often can lead to conflicts between diverse groups of actors. The new, unregulated, by law, model of the economy in some sectors has caused a lot of confusion, leading to conflicts, as well as a feeling of inequality. (shrink)

There has been a growing interest in research concerning memory modification technologies (MMTs) in recent years. Neuroscientists and psychologists are beginning to explore the prospect of controllable and intentional modification of human memory. One of the technologies with the greatest potential to this end is optogenetics—an invasive neuromodulation technique involving the use of light to control the activity of individual brain cells. It has recently shown the potential to modify specific long-term memories in animal models in ways not yet possible (...) with other MMTs. As the therapeutic potential of optogenetics has already prompted approval of the first human trials, it is especially important and timely to consider the opportunities and dangers this technology may entail. In this article, we focus on possible consequences of optogenetics as an MMT by analyzing fundamental threats potentially associated with memory modifications: the potential disruption of personality and authenticity. (shrink)

This chapter aims at describing the role of housing in the ageing population, on the example of Poland, which is one the fastest ageing country in the world. This issue is significant because housing well suited to the needs of older people means lower expenses in medical and social care. Seniors living in proper conditions remain not only longer healthy, but they may also stay longer active in the labor market. Housing adoption to the needs of an older population means (...) a particular challenge for Poland, where the majority of the housing stock was created in socialism and is inhabited by large by older people. It is crucial to raise awareness of age-friendly housing among the seniors, their relatives, architects, and policymakers. This purpose serves the first model apartment for seniors in Poland, which was created by the chapter's authors. (shrink)

The article presents edmund Husserl’s idea of transcendental phenomenology in the perspec‐ tive of the project of science. this aspect of Husserl’s writings was pointed out by, for example, rudolf Bernet, man ed Brelage, Iso Kern, eduard marbach, eugen Fink, Ludwig Landgrebe, and roman Ingarden. the main aim, realised in the article is to prove the main hypothesis claiming that transcendental phenomenology is closely connected with Husserl’s conception of philosophy, the idea of philosophy as a science (eidetic and transcendental). the (...) project of transcendental science and knowledge is also connected with Husserl’s conception of transcen‐ dental reduction taken as a mode of revealing those constitutive achievements of consciousness which were covered in the natural attitude. In the paper, I focus on presenting the most im‐ portant points (epistemological, methodological, and transcendental) connected with Husserl’s evolution of phenomenology in the perspective of the project of science. (shrink)

Publikacja składa się z dwu zasadniczych części, z których pierwsza zawiera rozprawy poświęcone twórczości Izydory Dąmbskiej, zaś druga - jej pracy własne, publikowane poprzednio w „Kwartalniku Filozoficznym". Tom otwiera wiersz Zbigniewa Herberta „Potęga smaku" dedykowany przez poetę tej wybitnej uczonej, który to utwór dobrze oddaje, w warstwie ideowej, wartości bliskie Dąmbskiej.

Yuri Matiyasevich's theorem states that the set of all Diophantine equations which have a solution in non-negative integers is not recursive. Craig Smoryński's theorem states that the set of all Diophantine equations which have at most finitely many solutions in non-negative integers is not recursively enumerable. Let R be a subring of Q with or without 1. By H_{10}(R), we denote the problem of whether there exists an algorithm which for any given Diophantine equation with integer coefficients, can decide whether (...) or not the equation has a solution in R. We prove that a positive solution to H_{10}(R) implies that the set of all Diophantine equations with a finite number of solutions in R is recursively enumerable. We show the converse implication for every infinite set R \subseteq Q such that there exist computable functions \tau_1,\tau_2:N \to Z which satisfy (\forall n \in N \tau_2(n) \neq 0) \wedge ({\frac{\tau_1(n)}{\tau_2(n)}: n \in N}=R). This implication for R=N guarantees that Smoryński's theorem follows from Matiyasevich's theorem. Harvey Friedman conjectures that the set of all polynomials of several variables with integer coefficients that have a rational solution is not recursive. Harvey Friedman conjectures that the set of all polynomials of several variables with integer coefficients that have only finitely many rational solutions is not recursively enumerable. These conjectures are equivalent by our results for R=Q. (shrink)

Multicellular organisms contain numerous symbiotic microorganisms, collectively called microbiomes. Recently, microbiomic research has shown that these microorganisms are responsible for the proper functioning of many of the systems of multicellular organisms. This has inclined some scholars to argue that it is about time to reconceptualise the organism and to develop a concept that would place the greatest emphasis on the vital role of microorganisms in the life of plants and animals. We believe that, unfortunately, there is a problem with this (...) suggestion, since there is no such thing as a universal concept of the organism which could constitute a basis for all biological sciences. Rather, the opposite is true: numerous alternative definitions exist. Therefore, comprehending how microbiomics is changing our understanding of organisms may be a very complex matter. In this paper we will demonstrate that this pluralism proves that claims about a change in our understanding of organisms can be treated as both true and untrue. Mainly, we assert that the existing concepts differ substantially, and that only some of them have to be reconsidered in order to incorporate the discoveries of microbiomics, while others are already flexible enough to do so. Taking into account the plurality of conceptualisations within different branches of modern biology, we will conduct our discussion using the developmental and the cooperation–conflict concepts of the organism. Then we will explain our results by referring to the recent philosophical debate on the nature of the concept of the organism within biology. (shrink)

Fritz von Herzmanovsky-Orlando, austriacki pisarz zmarły w 1954 r., którego dzieła, wydane przez Friedricha Torberga w 1957 r., zostały uznane za kwintesencję austriackości, ponownie wzbudził zainteresowanie germanistów. Kolejna, IQ-tomowa edycja Dziel wszystkich, które opierając się na źródłach i rezygnując ze skrótów oraz przeróbek Torberga, rzuca nowe światło na autora. Ujawnia ona m. in. jego antysłowiańskie i antysemickie skłonności, jego fascynację rasistowskimi teoriami Lanza Liebenfelsa i skłonności do mistyki.

Creations of many contemporary artists indicate the emergence of technoculture. Although artistic manifestations of technoculture may appear to be a provocation, they encourage fundamental ontological questions, such as whether a person has unchanging nature; what was and is our relationship to the Other, and what it should be; to what extent can body and mind be altered before they stop being “human”; what is the future of our species. To properly understand the works of technoculture artists, it appears necessary to (...) have a thorough grasp post- and transhumanism as their key sources of inspiration. As a result, the developed tools will be employed to indicate which aspects of technoculture are a manifestation of post- and transhumanist ideas. This analysis is based primarily on the works of Stelarc and Orlan – two widely commented artists of technoculture. (shrink)

To construct a synthetic cell we need to understand the rules that permit life. A central idea in modern biology is that in addition to the four entities making reality, matter, energy, space and time, a fifth one, information, plays a central role. As a consequence of this central importance of the management of information, the bacterial cell is organised as a Turing machine, where the machine, with its compartments defining an inside and an outside and its metabolism, reads and (...) expresses the genetic program carried by the genome. This highly abstract organisation is implemented using concrete objects and dynamics, and this is at the cost of repeated incompatibilities (frustration), which need to be sorted out by appropriate «patches». After describing the organisation of the genome into the paleome (sustaining and propagating life) and the cenome (permitting life in context), we describe some chemical hurdles that the cell as to cope with, ending with the specific case of the methionine salvage pathway. (shrink)

The language of phenomenology includes terms such as intentionality, phenom- enon, insight, analysis, sense, not to mention the key term of Edmund Husserl’s manifesto, “the things themselves” to return to . But what does the “things them- selves” properly mean? How come the term is replaced by the “findings” over time? And what are the findings for? The investigation begins by looking at the tricky legacy of the modern turn, trying to clarify ties to past masters, including Francis- co Suárez (...) and Augustine of Hippo . The former, because his influence goes beyond René Descartes reaching undoubtedly Franz Brentano and his students, as well as Martin Heidegger . The latter, because Augustine gives a personal component to the Greek inheritance, marked by the “inward turn .” However, it would not be possible to review the history of thought without the help offered by Jan Patočka's analyses . Patočka discloses the “care” of the Greek philosophers, Plato and Dem- ocritus among others, “for the soul”, we would say with Patočka for “being,” whose sense “does not leave us indifferent” as the leitmotiv of Ancient Philosophy . Nev- ertheless, in his lectures on Plato and Europe, Patočka points out that you must be careful not to confuse the phenomena of things, of existens, with the phenomena of being . Finally, Patočka’s legacy is found in the efforts to reconcile the life-feeling with the modern construction of reality, which means “a radical reconstruction of the naive and natural world of common sense .” In some ways, intentionality is to be revised . (shrink)

Husserl’s commitment to reality is marked by the urgency to return, or rather to a repeated return each time the objective is achieved . He explains this explicitly in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, taking his cue from Descartes’ Meditations . Reduction, which is the exact name for re- turn, means change of attitude, abandonment of the natural position as naive . Jan Patočka notes in this regard, that today people who have experienced modern sci- ence no (...) longer simply live in the naive natural world . The naive natural world is in- terpreted under species of the mathematical model . So, the gap between meaning as an expectation of experience and meaning within the framework of the model is increasingly evident . If intentionality, according to Husserl and disciples, includ- ing Heidegger, cannot be other than the idea itself, then it is just a something for something . It’s like giving voice to one thing and not another . Commitment to life (Husserl’s Lebenswelt) requires a return to corporeality, as Patočka adds, following Maine de Biran’s accurate insight, that is, of something immediately given, prior to any perceptual experience . The term “matrix” in the title brings to mind the eponymous 1999 film based on the philosophical metaphor of Plato’s cave in the fashion of the digital age . The protagonist, Neo, finds himself living for a long time in the lack of support of reality, precisely because of distrust: something is wrong, and this can only be felt . However, how can the hacker mentality help you under- stand that perhaps it is but a game? (shrink)

Stein’s theory of empathy lies at the intersection of the phenomenological findings of E. Husserl and M. Scheler. By presenting the issue of “empathy” in a broader framework, including intentionality, the originality of experience, the issue of personality and the individual identity, as well as the so-called world of values, namely the culture, I argue for a dynamic, process-oriented concept of dealing with feelings, namely diapathy. -/- Koncepcja Edyty Stein rozumienia drugiego człowieka jest znana z jej dysertacji O zagadnieniu wczucia. (...) Niemniej, gruntowne przebadanie struktury osobowości ludzkiej, jakie podjęła w Filozofii psychologii i humanistyki, rzuca nowe światło na tę kwestię. Stein dokonuje swoistej syntezy Husserlowskiego prymatu prawdy i Schelerowskiej koncepcji miłości, unikając przy tym idealizmu i woluntaryzmu, którym obarczone są te stanowiska. Steinowska koncepcja znajduje kontynuację w fenomenologii M. Merleau-Ponty’ego i R. Barbarasa. (shrink)

Tematem artykułu są nowe założenia w nauczaniu wiedzy okrajach niemieckiego obszaru językowego, zawarte w najnowszym curriculum dotyczącym tego przedmiotu. Cele, treści, metody, mierzenie postępu w nauce opierają się na czterech podstawowych zasadach: - integralności, która oznacza łączenie przekazywanych informacji z kompetencją językową i metodyczno-dydaktyczną; - łączenia i wzajemnego powiązania wiedzy z różnych dziedzin, np. realioznawstwo, kulturoznawstwo, historia itp.; - interkulturowości, tzn. rozwijania kompetencji, umiejętności, strategii w kontakcie z innymi kulturami; - ukierunkowania na działania, tzn. przekazywanie wiedzy nie w formie prezentacji (...) faktów, lecz na drodze indukcyjnej, także w formie projektów, wyjazdów studyjnych, kontaktów w kraju i za granicą. Nadrzędnym celem jest wykształcenie człowieka, który będzie dysponował nie tylko wiedzą z zakresu przedmiotu, ale także kompetencją fachowo-dydaktyczną, interkulturową i będzie w stanie samodzielnie interpretować zjawiska społeczne, polityczne i kulturowe w krajach niemieckiego obszaru językowego, a także we własnym zakresie uzupełniać swoją wiedzę. Ponieważ zjawiska te są w ciągłym rozwoju, nie należy zakładać, iż ogarnięty zostanie ich całokształt. Należy dążyć do naświetlenia różnorakich aspektów rzeczywistości społecznej z takich zakresów, jak np. jednostka i społeczeństwo, państwo i społeczeństwo, gospodarka, życie kulturalne itp. Przy ich omawianiu punktem wyjścia są doświadczenia i zainteresowania uczących się. Znajdują oni wspólnie takie tematy, które dają się rozbudowywać w różnych kierunkach w zależności od potrzeb i zainteresowań. Efektem takiego postępowania jest stworzenie nie listy obowiązujących tematów, lecz pewnej sieci wzajemnie z siebie wynikających problemów, którą ciągle można rozszerzać. Wdrożenie takiej drogi musi iść w parze z zastosowaniem różnorakich technik i metod. Powyższe curriculum uwzględnia także powstałą w ostatnich latach koncepcję nauczania wiedzy okrajach niemieckiego obszaru językowego nie w sposób sumaryczny, czyli omawiając kolejno te kraje i występujące w nich zjawiska, lecz w sposób zintegrowany i ukierunkowany na problem, tzn. odnosząc omawiane zjawiska do wszystkich krajów jednocześnie. (shrink)

The article presents the key problems relevant to the issue of “transcendent Action,” as Peirce calls it. The author focuses on the relation between “belief” and the “transcendentals:” unity, truth, goodness, and beauty, in their peculiar Peirceian context. He considers firstly “belief” in the sense of “an original impulse to act consistently, to have a definite intention” and, secondly, “Normative Science, which investigates the universal and necessary laws of the relation of Phenomena to Ends, that is, perhaps, to Truth, Right, (...) and Beauty.” Finally, he considers Peirce's defense again two popular accusations: one on the part of the logicians which “confounds psychical truths with psychological truths,” and the second one regarding hedonism. (shrink)

The issue “Human being in the digital era” is not superfluous. Every technology, i.e. literacy, print etc., gives tools, but at the same time impacts deeply human being. The article attempts to answer the following questions: what kind of change is taking place nowadays? what are the associated challenges? Is it true what Einstein once said: “The problems that exist in the world today cannot be solved by the level of thinking that created them”?

Basing itself on Edith Stein's research into philosophy of psychology and the humanities, this article focuses particularly on discussions of the theory of association. Stein's approach, rooted in Husserlian phenomenological perspective, seems to represent a significant contribution to the establish of an intellectual framework for the exploration of the philosophy of consciousness, and also seems helpful for inquiries into the issue pf practical know-how pertaining to remembering things, as well as the use of schemata in intellectual activity generally.

The expression “moral experience”, along with the concomitant notion of experience itself, seems to have been understood in divergent ways. Taking as a background three views currently operative in our culture - emotivism, the ethics of duty, and the notion of an ethics “beyond good and evil” - a conception of ethical experience will be presented based on the findings of Edith Stein as elaborated in her work "Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities".

SPIS TREŚCI Ryszard Moń Wstęp -/- Rozdział 1: Lękam się świata bez filozofii. O nieodzowności humanistyki w dobie techniki i globalizacji -/- 1.1 Konieczność filozofii 1.2 Narodziny sztuk wyzwolonych 1.3 Uniwersytet domem humanistyki 1.4 Upadek humanistyki 1.5 Uniwersytet – biznes i korporacyjna logika 1.6 Kognitywny kapitalizm 1.7 Złowroga moc etatyzmu 1.8 Pragmatyzm a ideały kształcenia 1.9 Demokracja – dialog, kultura, światopogląd 1.10 Humanistyka na straży demokracji 1.11 Edukacja filozoficzna w szkole 1.12 Podsumowanie – filozofia jako fundament -/- Rozdział 2: Czy (...) starożytna paideia może być alternatywą dla współczesnej pedagogiki? Antyczne metody wychowawcze i ich obecna rola -/- 2.1 Filozofia jako sposób życia 2.2 Rola ćwiczeń duchowych w paidei starożytnej Grecji oraz starożytnego Rzymu 2.3 Antyczna paideia a aktualne wzorce kształcenia -/- Rozdział 3: Problem ujawniania przez nauczyciela własnej tożsamości moralnej w nauczaniu etyki i filozofii -/- 3.1 Nauczyciel na lekcjach filozofii i etyki 3.2 Etyka, moralność i tożsamość 3.3 Matthew Lipmana filozofowanie z dziećmi i młodzieżą 3.4 Filozofia! Ale jaka? 3.5 Nauczyciel-filozof 3.6 Tożsamość moralna nauczyciela -/- Rozdział 4: Język i filozofia. O Naturalnym Metajęzyku Semantycznym i jego związkach z filozofią -/- 4.1 Naturalny Metajęzyk Semantyczny – rozważania wstępne 4.2 Inspiracje filozoficzne koncepcji NMS 4.3 Naturalny Metajęzyk Semantyczny – cel i założenia koncepcji 4.4 Kierunki rozwoju NMS 4.5 Jak wykorzystać NMS w dydaktyce filozofii? -/- Rozdział 5: Metody problemowe na lekcji etyki i filozofii jako możliwe działanie prewencyjne -/- 5.1 Metody rozwiązywania problemów – informacje ogólne 5.2 Rozwiązywanie problemów poznawczych 5.3 Rozwiązywanie problemów decyzyjnych 5.4 Rozwiązywanie problemów praktycznych 5.5 Nauczanie i uczenie się metodą „układanki” 5.6 Metoda wychowania bez porażek 5.7 Rola nauczyciela 5.8 Kształcenie umiejętności rozwiązywania problemów 5.9 Oceny i wartościowania 5.10 Podsumowanie Rozdział 6: Trudności w uczeniu się – profilaktyka i terapia -/- 6.1 Trudności w uczeniu się 6.2 Specyficzne trudności w uczeniu się 6.3 Niepowodzenia szkolne 6.4 Profilaktyka i terapia -/- Aneks – konspekty lekcji o tematyce filozoficznej i etycznej. (shrink)

Bez wątpienia, Peirce nie oferuje w swoim pismach jasnego ujęcia koncepcji przekonania, a jego poglądy, ewoluujące w ciągu całego życia, nie wydają się prowadzić do wyraźnej konkluzji. Niemniej jednak pozostaje autorem inspirującym, który pozosta- wił trwałe osiągnięcia na gruncie logiki symbolicznej i semiotyki. Metoda hermeneutyczna, którą zastosowaliśmy w tej pracy, miała na celu, w zgodzie z jego własną wskazówką metodyczną, ukazanie koncepcji przekonania, którą można by uzgodnić z dostępnymi stwierdzeniami samego Peirce’a, jak również jego komentatorów.

Despite pervasive variation in the content of laws, legal theorists and anthropologists have argued that laws share certain abstract features and even speculated that law may be a human universal. In the present report, we evaluate this thesis through an experiment administered in 11 different countries. Are there cross‐cultural principles of law? In a between‐subjects design, participants (N = 3,054) were asked whether there could be laws that violate certain procedural principles (e.g., laws applied retrospectively or unintelligible laws), and also (...) whether there are any such laws. Confirming our preregistered prediction, people reported that such laws cannot exist, but also (paradoxically) that there are such laws. These results document cross‐culturally and –linguistically robust beliefs about the concept of law which defy people's grasp of how legal systems function in practice. (shrink)

W językoznawstwie wiele miejsca poświęca się w ostatnim czasie językom fachowym. Językoznawcy najczęściej podejmują badania dotyczące języka medycyny, ekonomii czy w ostatnim czasie Unii Europejskiej. Rzadziej, choć wymaga tego rzeczywistość, analizuje się język prawny czy też prawniczy. Trzeba zaznaczyć, że język prawny nie jest językiem fachowym w ogólnie przyjętym tego słowa znaczeniu. Opisuje on sytuacje, które są ważne dla opinii publicznej, które muszą być, dla dobra obywateli, uregulowane poprzez przepisy. Przepisy są wprawdzie tworzone przez prawników, powinny być jednak rozumiane przez (...) ogół społeczeństwa. Prawnicy posługują się najczęściej językiem, którego cechy nie są proste do uszeregowania. Język prawny i prawniczy charakteryzuje się skomplikowaną składnią, stylem, który unika wszelkich ozdobników. Problem wiąże się jednak przede wszystkim z prawidłowym odczytaniem znaczeń używanych pojęć. Można tu mówić o dwóch rodzajach pojęć, gdyż język prawny używa terminów tjpowych dla tej dziedziny, takich jak np. prawo majątkowe, prawo autorskie czy ustawa, jednak obok nich pojawiają się często pojęcia zaczerpnięte z języka ogólnego, które w pewnych kolokacjach nabierają innego z punktu widzenia prawa znaczenia, np. orzeczenie, wyrok czy własność. Autorka niniejszego tekstu próbuje odpowiedzieć na pytanie, jak dalece pojęcia języka ogólnego wnikają w język prawny i czy ma miejsce odwrotny proces oraz w jakim stopniu może mieć to wpływ na rozumienie tekstu. Odpowiedź nie jest z pewnością prosta, ale należy wierzyć, że dalsze badania prowadzone nad językiem prawnym przybliżą semantyczne aspekty różnic pomiędzy językiem prawnym a ogólnym i tym samym ułatwią rozumienie tekstów ustaw czy wyroków sądowych. (shrink)

Tekst ten ma na celu przybliżenie problemu jednoznaczności języka prawa na podstawie niemieckich i polskich wyroków sądowych. Język prawa jest tak bogaty i różnorodny, że trudno o jego jednoznaczną, definicję. Język wyroków sądowych wydaje się zaprzeczać temu stwierdzeniu. Wyrok sądowy jako pewien schematyczny rodzaj tekstu jest bardziej uporządkowany i jednolity. Wyrok jako produkt myślowego procesu prowadzącego sprawę sędziego cechuje pewna budowa. Każda część wyroku sądowego (rubrum, tenor, stan faktyczny czy uzasadnienie) charakteryzuje się odpowiednim stylem i w zależności od jej przeznaczenia (...) odpowiednimi środkami wyrazu. Na podstawie badań przeprowadzonych na autentycznych wyrokach sądowych można stwierdzić, że ta właściwość wyróżnia wyrok sądowy od innych tekstów prawniczych. Mimo tej różnorodności językowej w ramach jednego wyroku, można śmiało stwierdzić, że każda z jego części wyróżnia się użyciem tylko niektórych zjawisk językowych, takich jak np. strona bierna czy styl nominalny. I tak np. w trzeciej części wyroku, w której przedstawiany jest stan faktyczny sprawy procesowej, pojawi się bardzo wiele zdań w stronie biernej itp. Każdy sędzia ma swój własny styl. Jednakże tworząc wyrok sądowy, powinien się trzymać pewnych reguł, zarówno formalnych, jak i językowych. Jest to ściśle określone m. in. w kodeksie postępowania cywilnego. Dzięki tym regułom wyrok sądowy nabiera jako tekst prawniczy właściwego dla siebie charakteru. Nie jest to język prosty i wymaga wielu lat praktyki początkowo aplikantów, asesorów czy w końcu sędziów sądów najwyższych. Zaprezentowany tekst podejmuje tylko próbę przybliżenia owych zasad i ukazuje je na licznych przykładach, które zostały zaczerpnięte z autentycznych wyroków sądów polskich i niemieckich. (shrink)

In common with traditional forms of epistemic internalism, epistemological disjunctivism attempts to incorporate an awareness condition on justification. Unlike traditional forms of internalism, however, epistemological disjunctivism rejects the so-called New Evil Genius thesis. In so far as epistemological disjunctivism rejects the New Evil Genius thesis, it is revisionary. -/- After explaining what epistemological disjunctivism is, and how it relates to traditional forms of epistemic internalism / externalism, I shall argue that the epistemological disjunctivist’s account of the intuitions underlying the New (...) Evil Genius thought experiment is at best incomplete. As presented, therefore, epistemological disjunctivism is unable to accommodate the core guiding intuitions of epistemic internalism. Given the stated aim of not being revisionary on this score, the view is at a dialectical disadvantage over the traditional forms of epistemic internalism the position is meant to replace. Unfortunately, therefore, at present, the impasse between internalism and externalism remains. (shrink)

The New Evil Demon problem has been hotly debated since the case was introduced in the early 1980’s (e.g. Lehrer and Cohen 1983; Cohen 1984), and there seems to be recent increased interest in the topic. In a forthcoming collection of papers on the New Evil Demon problem (Dutant and Dorsch, forthcoming), at least two of the papers, both by prominent epistemologists, attempt to resist the problem by appealing to the distinction between justification and excuses. My primary aim here is (...) to critically evaluate this new excuse maneuver as a response to the New Evil Demon problem. -/- Their response attempts to give us reason to reject the idea that victims of the New Evil Demon have justification for believing as they do. I shall argue that this approach is ultimately unsuccessful, however much of value can be learned from these attempts. In particular, progress in the debate can be made by following those who advance the excuse maneuver and make explicit the connection between epistemic justification and epistemic norms. By doing so, the questions being debated are clarified, as is the methodology being used to attempt to answer them. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the value of epistemic justification cannot be adequately explained as being instrumental to truth. I intend to show that false belief, which is no means to truth, can nevertheless still be of epistemic value. This in turn will make a good prima facie case that justification is valuable for its own sake. If this is right, we will have also found reason to think that truth value monism is false: assuming that true belief does (...) have value, there is more of final epistemic value than mere true belief. (shrink)

What is it to be a woman? What is it to be a man? We start by laying out desiderata for an analysis of 'woman' and 'man': descriptively, it should link these gender categories to sex biology without reducing them to sex biology, and politically, it should help us explain and combat traditional sexism while also allowing us to make sense of the activist view that gendering should be consensual. Using a Putnam-style 'Twin Earth' example, we argue that none of (...) the existing analyses in the feminist literature succeeds in meeting all of our desiderata. Finally, we propose a positive account that we believe can satisfy all the desiderata outlined. According to our theory, the genders 'woman' and 'man' are individuated not by their contemporary connections to sex biology, but by their historical continuity with classes that were originally closely connected to sex biology. (shrink)

What makes an intellectual virtue a virtue? A straightforward and influential answer to this question has been given by virtue-reliabilists: a trait is a virtue only insofar as it is truth-conducive. In this paper I shall contend that recent arguments advanced by Jack Kwong in defence of the reliabilist view are good as far as they go, in that they advance the debate by usefully clarifying ways in how best to understand the nature of open-mindedness. But I shall argue that (...) these considerations do not establish the desired conclusions that open-mindedness is truth-conducive. To establish these much stronger conclusions we would need an adequate reply to what I shall call Montmarquet’s objection. I argue that Linda Zagzebski’s reply to Montmarquet’s objection, to which Kwong defers, is inadequate. I conclude that it is contingent if open-mindedness is truth-conducive, and if a necessary tie to truth is what makes an intellectual virtue a virtue, then the status of open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue is jeopardised. We either need an adequate reliabilist response to Montmarquet’s objection, or else seek alternative accounts of what it is that makes a virtue a virtue. I conclude by briefly outlining some alternatives. (shrink)

The objective of Working Group 4 of the COST Action NET4Age-Friendly is to examine existing policies, advocacy, and funding opportunities and to build up relations with policy makers and funding organisations. Also, to synthesize and improve existing knowledge and models to develop from effective business and evaluation models, as well as to guarantee quality and education, proper dissemination and ensure the future of the Action. The Working Group further aims to enable capacity building to improve interdisciplinary participation, to promote knowledge (...) exchange and to foster a cross-European interdisciplinary research capacity, to improve cooperation and co-creation with cross-sectors stakeholders and to introduce and educate students SHAFE implementation and sustainability. To enable the achievement of the objectives of Working Group 4, the Leader of the Working Group, the Chair and Vice-Chair, in close cooperation with the Science Communication Coordinator, developed a template to map the current state of SHAFE policies, funding opportunities and networking in the COST member countries of the Action. On invitation, the Working Group lead received contributions from 37 countries, in a total of 85 Action members. The contributions provide an overview of the diversity of SHAFE policies and opportunities in Europe and beyond. These were not edited or revised and are a result of the main areas of expertise and knowledge of the contributors; thus, gaps in areas or content are possible and these shall be further explored in the following works and reports of this WG. But this preliminary mapping is of huge importance to proceed with the WG activities. In the following chapters, an introduction on the need of SHAFE policies is presented, followed by a summary of the main approaches to be pursued for the next period of work. The deliverable finishes with the opportunities of capacity building, networking and funding that will be relevant to undertake within the frame of Working Group 4 and the total COST Action. The total of country contributions is presented in the annex of this deliverable. (shrink)

In general, epistemic internalists hold that an individual’s justification for a belief is exhausted by her reflectively accessible reasons for thinking that the contents of her beliefs are true. Applying this to the epistemology of testimony, a hearer’s justification for beliefs acquired through testimony is exhausted by her reflectively accessible reasons to think that the contents of the speaker’s testimony is true. A consequence of internalism is that subjects that are alike with respect to their reflectively accessible reasons are alike (...) with respect to what they have justification to believe. Testimony should be thought no different: hearers that are alike with respect to reflectively accessible reasons to think that a speaker’s testimony is true are alike with respect to their justification for beliefs based upon that testimony. But it has been recently argued that this view faces powerful counterexamples. So the central question is this: assuming that a hearer can acquire justification to believe a proposition through the testimony of a speaker, can epistemic internalism provide the resources to explain how such justification is possible? My aim in this paper is to address these counterexamples, and in so doing, defend epistemic internalist accounts of testimony. (shrink)

The current resurgence of interest in cognition and in the nature of cognitive processing has brought with it also a renewed interest in the early work of Husserl, which contains one of the most sustained attempts to come to grips with the problems of logic from a cognitive point of view. Logic, for Husserl, is a theory of science; but it is a theory which takes seriously the idea that scientific theories are constituted by the mental acts of cognitive subjects. (...) The present essay begins with an exposition of Husserl's act-based conception of what a science is, and goes on to consider his account of the role of linguistic meanings, of the ontology of scientific objects, and of evidence and truth. The essay concentrates almost exclusively on the Logical Investigations of 1900/01. This is not only because this work, which is surely Husserl's single most important masterpiece, has been overshadowed first of all by his Ideas I and then later by the Crisis. It is also because the Investigations contain, in a peculiarly clear and pregnant form, a whole panoply of ideas on logic and cognitive theory which either simply disappeared in Husserl's own later writings or became obfuscated by an admixture of that great mystery which is 'transcendental phenomenology'. (shrink)

This chapter first surveys general issues in the epistemic internalism / externalism debate: what is the distinction, what motivates it, and what arguments can be given on both sides. -/- The second part of the chapter will examine the internalism / externalism debate as regards to the specific case of the epistemology of memory belief.

In the wake of the advent of genome editing technology CRISPR-Cas9 (clustered regularly interspaced palindromic repeat (CRISPR)-associated protein 9), there has been a global debate around the implications of manipulating the human genome. While CRISPR-based germline gene editing is new, the debate about the ethics of gene editing is not – for several decades now, scholars have debated the ethics of making heritable changes to the human genome. The arguments that have been raised both for and against the use of (...) genetic technologies in human reproduction reiterate much of the arguments made in the pre-CRISPR debate. As such, it is instructive for South Africa to reflect on these arguments now, in considering our position on the regulation of the use of this novel biotechnology. There are two dominant schools of thought in this area, bioliberalism and bioconservatism. Bioconservatives raise concerns about the risks of genetic manipulation, and argue that it ought to be limited or prohibited to avert these risks to human health and human nature. Bioliberal scholars are more open to the prospect of genetic manipulation, because of its potential utility. In this article, I conclude that in liberal democracies such as our own, bioliberal arguments ought to be seriously considered when formulating policy on human genome editing because of the extent to which they resonate with our Constitutional values and human rights. I further suggest that there is a need for an enquiry into the relevance of African perspectives on the ethical questions that arise concerning germline genome editing. (shrink)

Epistemic internalism, by stressing the indispensability of the subject’s perspective, strikes many as plausible at first blush. However, many people have tended to reject the position because certain kinds of beliefs have been thought to pose special problems for epistemic internalism. For example, internalists tend to hold that so long as a justifier is available to the subject either immediately or upon introspection, it can serve to justify beliefs. Many have thought it obvious that no such view can be correct, (...) as it has been alleged that internalism cannot account for the possibility of the justification of beliefs stored in memory. -/- My aim in this paper is to offer a response that explains how memory justification is possible in a way that is consistent with epistemic internalism and an awareness condition on justification. Specifically, I will explore the plausibility of various options open to internalists, including both foundationalist and non-foundationalist approaches to the structure of justification. I intend to show that despite other difficult challenges that epistemic internalism might face, memory belief poses no special problems that the resources of internalism cannot adequately address. (shrink)

Some objections to the idea that disputed territories should be auctioned.

Recreational Drugs European Network (ReDNet) project aims to use the Psychonaut Web Mapping Project database (Psychonaut Web Mapping Group, 2009) containing novel psychoactive compounds usually not mentioned in the scientific literature and thus unknown to clinicians as a unique source of information. The database will be used to develop an integrated ICT prevention approach targeted at vulnerable individuals and focused on novel synthetic and herbal compounds and combinations. Particular care will be taken in keeping the health professionals working directly with (...) young people showing problematic behaviors regularly updated in terms of novel compounds and combinations as well. A user-friendly project website will be developed aimed primarily at delivering the information/prevention approaches, but will also be a way of communicating with project partners and relevant stakeholders (e.g. thematic forum facilities, instant messages, blogs, video chat, wikiblog, newsletters distributed via mailing list). The website will support various ICT prevention tools, including an SMS alert service. Different areas and sections will be aimed specifically at the different target groups. -/- . (shrink)

We presuppose a position of scientific realism to the effect (i) that the world exists and (ii) that through the working out of ever more sophisticated theories our scientific picture of reality will approximate ever more closely to the world as it really is. Against this background consider, now, the following question: 1. Do the empirical theories with the help of which we seek to approximate a good or true picture of reality rest on any non-empirical presuppositions? One can answer (...) this question with either a 'yes' or a 'no'. 'No' is the preferred answer of most contemporary methodologists -- Murray Rothbard is one distinguished counterexample to this trend -- who maintain that empirical theories are completely free of non-empirical ('a priori') admixtures and who see science as a matter of the gathering of pure 'data' obtained through simple observation. From such data scientific propositions are then supposed to be somehow capable of being established. (shrink)

The copy provided on ths site is a late draft. It provides a philosophical argument for the view that by and large it is morally wrong to buy shares in a company that is behaving badly unless you (if necessary acting together with others) are able and willing to prevent the misbehaviour. A key lemma in my argument concerns a chain of authorisation from the shareholders to the company's board to the CEO -- one in virtue of which shareholders are (...) ultimately responsible for major patterns of wrongdoing by the company. (shrink)

"Nothing Better Than Death" is a comprehensive analysis of the near-death experiences profiled on my website at www.near-death.com. This book provides complete NDE testimonials, summaries of various NDEs, NDE research conclusions, a question and answer section, an analysis of NDEs and Christian doctrines, famous quotations about life and death, a NDE bibliography, book notes, a list of NDE resources on the Internet, and a list of NDE support groups associated with IANDS.org - the International Association for Near-Death Studies. -/- The (...) unusual title of this book, "Nothing Better Than Death," was inspired by NDE experiencer Dr. Dianne Morrissey who once said, "If I lived a billion years more, in my body or yours, there's not a single experience on Earth that could ever be as good as being dead. Nothing." -/- Having read every NDE book I could get my hands on, I didn't want to create just another NDE book. My motivation was to give readers a large variety of information about NDEs challenging both the seasoned NDE enthusiast as well as the novice. This book gives readers the means to understand the NDE phenomenon from the perspective of a large number of some of the most profound NDEs ever documented. My hope is that you will enjoy this book, my labor of love, and that you will be truly blessed by the heavenly insights within it. (shrink)

This is a description and analysis of the intellectual culture of the eighteenth-century Church of England. Challenging conventional perceptions of the Church as an intellectually moribund institution, the study traces the influence of thinkers such as Locke, Newton, Burke, and Gibbon on theological debate in England during this period.

Influential cases have been provided that seem to suggest that one can fail to have knowledge because of the social environment. If not a distinct kind of social defeater, is there a uniquely social phenomenon that defeats knowledge? My aim in this paper is to explore these questions. I shall argue that despite initial appearances to the contrary, we have no reason to accept a special class of social defeater, nor any essentially social defeat phenomenon. We can explain putative cases (...) of social defeat with our existing epistemological apparatus. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that self-awareness is intertwined with one's awareness of possibilities for action. I show this by critically examining Dan Zahavi's multidimensional account of the self. I argue that the distinction Zahavi makes among 'pre-reflective minimal', 'interpersonal', and 'normative' dimensions of selfhood needs to be refined in order to accommodate what I call 'pre-reflective self-understanding'. The latter is a normative dimension of selfhood manifest not in reflection and deliberation, but in the habits and style of a person’s (...) pre-reflective absorption in the world. After reviewing Zahavi's multidimensional account and revealing this gap in his explanatory taxonomy, I draw upon Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Frankfurt in order to sketch an account of pre-reflective self-understanding. I end by raising an objection to Zahavi’s claim for the primitive and foundational status of pre-reflective self-awareness. To carve off self-awareness from the self’s practical immersion in a situation where things and possibilities already matter and draw one to act is to distort the phenomena. A more careful phenomenology of pre-reflective action shows that pre-reflective self-awareness and pre-reflective self-understanding are co-constitutive, both mutually for each other and jointly for everyday experience. (shrink)

According to Heidegger's Being and Time, social relations are constitutive of the core features of human agency. On this view, which I call a ‘strong conception’ of sociality, the core features of human agency cannot obtain in an individual subject independently of social relations to others. I explain the strong conception of sociality captured by Heidegger's underdeveloped notion of ‘being-with’ by reconstructing Heidegger's critique of the ‘weak conception’ of sociality characteristic of Kant's theory of agency. According to a weak conception, (...) sociality is a mere aggregation of individual subjects and the core features of human agency are built into each individual mind. The weak conception of sociality remains today widely taken for granted. I show that Christine Korsgaard, one of the most creative contemporary appropriators of Kant, operates with a weak conception of sociality and that this produces a problematic explanatory deficiency in her view: she is unable to explain the peculiar motivational efficacy of shared social norms. Heidegger's view is tailor made to explain this phenomenon. I end by sketching how Heidegger provides a social explanation of a major systematic concern animating Korsgaard, the concern with the importance of individual autonomy and answerability in human life. (shrink)